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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
After the initial briefing was completed in this case, the Idaho Supreme Court's 
opinion in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), became final. The 
Court of Appeals requested supplemental briefing on the issue of what affect the 
holding in Murphy, "that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a 
sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908 for allowing a successive petition," 156 Idaho at 
_, 327 P.3d at 367, has on the outcome of this case. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Relevant to this supplemental brief, the Court of Appeals previously set forth the 
following factual background for this case: 
In 2003, Parvin filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief 
alleging, in pertinent part, ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 
ensure that his Rule 35 motion was ruled upon in a reasonable period of 
time. Parvin requested assistance of counsel, which the district court 
granted and appointed the Canyon County Public Defender. A conflict 
was discovered and the case was transferred to a conflict public defender. 
After the subsequent appointment, the State filed a motion for summary 
dismissal. A notice of substitution of counsel was filed as another attorney 
took over the case. No other action was taken until a notice of intent to 
dismiss was filed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(c). The 
district court filed an order of dismissal thereafter. 
Parvin later testified that he never received notice from either the 
district court or his appointed counsel of the proposed dismissal. Upon 
learning of the dismissal, Parvin filed a notice of appeal, which was then 
dismissed because it was untimely. 
Parvin filed another application for post-conviction relief, re-alleging 
the grounds in the original application, and alleging several additional 
claims of ineffective assistance of his post-conviction counsel. Once 
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again, Parvin argued that his original trial attorney was ineffective for 
failing to ensure that the district court ruled on his Rule 35 motion in a 
timely manner. He also asserted that he was entitled to a successive 
petition "because my claims were not knowingly or voluntarily waived. My 
claims were dismissed due to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel." 
Parvin v. State, Docket No. 38295, 2012 Unpublished Op. No. 453 at 3-4 (Idaho App., 
April 30, 2012). The district court agreed, determining that "Parvin was justified in filing 
the second post conviction action" because "he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel in his first post conviction action because the action was dismissed for 
counsel's failure to take any action on [Parvin's) behalf." (38295 R., p.156.) 
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ISSUE 
Parvin states the issue on appeal as: 
Does the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Murphy preclude Mr. 
Parvin from obtaining relief on appeal? 
(Appellant's supp. brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Does the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Murphy, "that ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel is not a sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908 for allowing a 
successive petition," provide an additional basis for affirming the district court's order 
denying Parvin's successive petition for post-conviction relief? 
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SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Supreme Court's Holding In Murphy Provides An Additional Basis For 
Affirming The District Court's Order Denying Parvin's Successive Petition 
A Introduction 
Below, Parvin, citing to Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596, 635 P.2d 955, 
960 (1981 ), requested leave to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief, 
arguing that his "claims were dismissed due to the ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel." (38295 R., p.24.) Consistent with Palmer, the district court 
permitted Parvin's successive petition because he was deprived of the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel. (Id., p.156.) Palmer was overturned in the Idaho 
Supreme Court's recent opinion in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, _, 327 P.3d 365, 
367 (2014), which held "that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a 
sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908 for allowing a successive petition." Parvin, 
therefore, was not entitled to bring a successive petition in this case, and that is an 
additional basis on which this Court can affirm the district court's ultimate denial of 
Parvin's successive petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of 
deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of 
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State 
v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 
Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
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C. Parvin Was Not Entitled To A Successive Petition Based On The Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel In His Original Post-Conviction Proceeding 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. Idaho Code§ 19-4908 states: 
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must 
be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any 
ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or 
sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure 
relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court 
finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not 
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or 
amended application. 
Under the Idaho Supreme Court's prior precedent in Palmer, an allegation of ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel which resulted in claims of trial error being waived 
or inadequately raised could provide sufficient reason to file a successive petition. 
Palmer, 102 Idaho at 596, 635 P.2d at 960. The Court specifically overruled that 
precedent in Murphy. Murphy, 156 Idaho at_, 327 P.3d at 371. 
The Court in Murphy explained that, after Palmer, the United States Supreme 
Court clarified in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), that there was no Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 
_, 327 P.3d at 370. The Court further noted that "[w]here states have allowed 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claims it is generally where a state 
statute expressly mandates appointment of post-conviction counsel." kl (citations 
omitted). But the appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings is discretionary 
under Idaho law. kl at_, 327 P.3d at 371 (citations omitted); see also I.C. § 19-
4904. Therefore, there is no right to post-conviction counsel and, "[w]here there is no 
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right to counsel, there can be no deprivation of effective assistance of counsel." kt 
Because there is no right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, whether 
constitutional or statutory, a petitioner cannot demonstrate "sufficient reason" for filing a 
successive petition based on ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel. kt 
The district court found that Parvin's post-conviction action was dismissed as a 
result of Parvin's counsel's ineffective inaction. (38295 R., pp.155-56.) Based on that 
finding, and consistent with the overruled precedent, the district court allowed Parvin's 
successive petition. (Id., p.156.) But ineffectiveness of counsel did not entitle Parvin to 
a successive petition for post-conviction relief. Murphy, 156 Idaho at_, 327 P.3d at 
371. Because Parvin was not entitled to a successive petition for post-conviction relief, 
the district court could not err by ultimately denying that petition. 
On appeal, Parvin argues that his case is distinguishable from Murphy and that 
he was entitled to relief consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's precedent in Eby v. 
State, 148 Idaho 731, 228 P.3d 998 (2010). (Appellant's supp. brief, pp.4-6.) Like this 
case, the district court in Eby dismissed the post-conviction petition for inactivity after 
Eby's appointed attorneys failed to file an amended petition or otherwise do any work on 
his case for more than two years. kt at 732-33, 228 P.3d at 999-1000. Unlike this 
case, after learning that the petition had been dismissed, Eby, through counsel, sought 
relief from the order of dismissal pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). kt at 
733-34, 228 P.3d at 1000-01. The Court, "recognize[ing] and reiterat[ing]" that "there is 
no right to effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction cases," still concluded that 
Eby's "case may present the 'unique and compelling circumstances' in which I.R.C.P. 
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60(b)(6) relief may well be warranted," due to his counsels' utter lack of representation. 
~ at 737, 228 P.3d at 1004 (citations omitted). 
That a petitioner may be entitled to Rule 60(b )(6) relief where post-conviction 
counsel fails to provide representation does not mean that the absence of meaningful 
representation presents sufficient reason under Idaho Code § 19-4908 for reasserting 
waived claims in a successive petition. Rather, Eby demonstrates that there is already 
a remedy for a lack of representation from post-conviction counsel: A Rule 60(b) motion 
filed in the initial proceedings-not a successive petition. By its very terms, the Eby 
decision is "limited in scope" and applies only to requests for Rule 60(b) relief in post-
conviction cases. Eby, 148 Idaho at 736, 228 P.3d at 1003. Moreover, Eby holds that 
where a district court appoints post-conviction counsel but counsel does nothing, 
resulting in the dismissal of the petition for inactivity, Rule 60(b)(6) confers upon the 
court the discretion, in the original post-conviction case, to determine whether appointed 
counsel's shortcomings constitute a unique and compelling circumstance warranting 
relief from the order of dismissal. Eby, 148 Idaho at 734-38, 228 P.3d at 1001-05. It 
does not provide for a successive petition. 
Perhaps recognizing this, Parvin asks this Court to salvage his successive 
petition for post-conviction relief by construing it as a motion under Rule 60(b)(6). 
(Appellant's supp. brief, p.6.) Generally, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to 
petitions for post-conviction relief. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 
646 (2008). Rule 60(b) allows the court, "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just" 
to "relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for" mistake, newly 
discovered evidence, fraud, etc., and "any other reason justifying relief from the 
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operation of the judgment." Rule 60(b), however, also has a timeliness component, 
which requires that "[t]he motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for 
reasons (1 ), (2), and (3) not more than six (6) months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken." 
Even if this Court were to construe PaNin's successive petition as a Rule 
60(b)(6) motion, it would be untimely because it was not filed within a reasonable time 
of the judgment. The judgment dismissing Parvin's post-conviction petition was filed on 
February 26, 2007. (38295 R., p.155.) Below, PaNin claimed that his post-conviction 
counsel failed to inform him that his original petition was being dismissed. (Id., pp.7, 23-
24.) Assuming the truth of this uncontradicted claim, PaNin still knew that his petition 
had been summarily dismissed sometime before he filed his untimely appeal of that 
dismissal on May 22, 2008. (Id., p.147.) But Parvin did not file a successive petition for 
post-conviction relief based on his prior post-conviction counsel's ineffective assistance 
until September 16, 2008. (Id., p.5) Even allowing that Parvin's initial lack of 
knowledge may extend what could be considered a reasonable time for filing a Rule 
60(b)(6) motion from the judgment, he did not file within a "reasonable time." The 
motion would therefore have been untimely. 
Parvin asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court's holdings in Eby and Murphy are 
entirely consistent (Appellant's brief, p.5), and the state agrees. Where post-conviction 
counsel's ineffective assistance results in the waiver of claims, that is not a sufficient 
reason to allow a successive petition for post-conviction relief, Murphy, but it may 
provide a Rule 60(b) remedy in the original petition, Eby. This appeal arises from a 
successive petition based on post-conviction counsel's ineffective assistance, not a 
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Rule 60(b) motion filed in the original petition, and is therefore precluded under Murphy. 
Moreover, Parvin's successive petition for post-conviction relief was not filed within a 
reasonable time of the judgment, or even of the time in which Parvin certainly became 
aware of the judgment. Even construed as a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, therefore, it would 
be untimely and still precluded. 
The successive petition bar of Idaho Code § 19-4908 expresses a preference for 
the finality of judgments. If a post-conviction petitioner believes appointed counsel has 
failed to provide any meaningful representation, under Eby, the time to challenge 
counsel's performance is in the original post-conviction action. Murphy makes clear that 
such claims may not be raised in a successive post-conviction petition; otherwise, 
"claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the immediate prior proceeding may be 
raised ad infinitum." Murphy, 156 Idaho at _, 327 P.3d at 370 (quotation omitted). 
Because ineffective assistance of counsel is not a "sufficient reason" for overcoming the 
successive petition bar of Idaho Code § 19-4908, and because ineffective assistance of 
counsel was the only reason for granting Parvin a successive petition, the Court's 
holding in Murphy provides an additional basis for affirming the district court's ultimate 
denial of Parvin's successive petition. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's denial of 
Parvin's successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 2014. 
·~ CR~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of October, 2014, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
to: 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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